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2A- 6/29/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Respondent, 
-G-ASE—NO-.—D- 02 52 
upon a Charge of Violation of §210.1 of 
the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 8, 1992, the City of Yonkers filed a charge alleging 
that Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters violated 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law (CSL) in that.it caused, 
instigated, encouraged or condoned a strike against the City of 
Yonkers on May 14, 15 and 18, 1992. 
The parties requested PERB's Counsel (Counsel) to recommend 
to this Board a proposed penalty under which the Respondent's 
dues and agency fee deduction rights would be suspended for a 
period of three months. 
Upon the understanding that Counsel would recommend, and 
this Board would accept that penalty, the Respondent withdrew its 
answer to the charge. Counsel has so recommended. We determine 
that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one and is 
consistent with the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, be 
suspended, commencing at the first practicable date, and 
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continuing for a period of three months. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the City of 
Yonkers until the Respondent affirms that it no longer asserts 
the right to strike against any government as required by the 
provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fads. l*w N JCv\<l\ L 
auline R. Kinsella, < Chairperson 
CL- 2f . 
Walter L, Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
2B- 6/29/9 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF DELAWARE Case No. S-0057 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law (CSL), the County 
of Delaware (County) has submitted an application by which it 
seeks a determination that the Delaware County Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act, as amended on April 14, 1993, by Local Law 
No. 94-1993, is substantially equivalent to the provisions and 
procedures set forth in CSL Article 14 with respect to the State. 
The amendment brings the County's local law into conformity with 
Chapter 723 of the Laws of 1991, which extended the CSL §209.4 
interest arbitration provisions to Criminal Investigators 
employed in the office of the district attorney. 
Having reviewed the application, and having determined that 
the subject local law, as amended, is substantially equivalent to 
the provisions and procedures set forth in CSL Article 14 with 
respect to the State, 
IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of Delaware 
be., and_i-t_her.eh.y_i.S-, approved 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
£j(.:. ff±»_f 
PauLine R. Kinsella^Chairperson 
2C- 6/29/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13053 
CITY OP SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
6RASS0 & GRASSO (KATHLEEN R. DeCATALDO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (ELAYNE G. GOLD of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). After a hearing, the 
Assistant Director dismissed the PBA's charge against the City of 
Schenectady (City) which alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by dealing directly with a member of its unit, Lieutenant 
Michael Moffett, regarding a flexible work schedule. 
The Assistant Director found that Captain Patrick Smith, the 
supervisor of the investigations services bureau, permitted 
Moffett to work a schedule other than the one posted when he bid 
Board - U-13053 -2 
for a job-'' in the investigations bureau. Despite Smith's 
supervisory position,-7 the Assistant Director held that Smith's 
dealings and agreement with Moffett could not be attributed to 
the City because Smith's dealings were unknown to others and 
contrary to instructions given Smith by the Police Commissioner 
that the posted shift could not be changed. 
The PBA argues that the Assistant Director erred on the 
facts and law in failing to hold the City responsible for Smith's 
dealings with Moffett. It also excepts to a ruling made by the 
Assistant Director during the hearing which limited the scope of 
its cross-examination of Smith. 
The City argues in its response that the Assistant 
Director's dismissal of the charge was correct on the facts and 
the law, as was his ruling during the hearing which merely 
excluded irrelevant and immaterial evidence. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision. 
Section 209-a.l of the Act defines the improper practices of 
a "public employer or its agents". It is plain, therefore, that 
actions by persons who are not deemed agents of the public 
employer—cannot-violate any of -the—improper-practice-provisions— 
of the Act. The issue before us then is whether Smith's 
-'The shift was scheduled from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Smith 
permitted Moffett to work 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on the days he 
attended night school. 
-'Captains, in order of seniority, are third in command after the 
Police Commissioner and the Police Chief. 
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discussions and agreement with Moffett regarding Moffett's work 
schedule may be attributed to the City under agency theories. In 
applying those agency principles in the labor relations context, 
we have taken a liberal approach, not limiting ourselves in 
assessing an employer's responsibility for the conduct of others 
to a strict application of the rules of agency or respondeat 
superior.-7 It is equally true, however, that an employer is 
not always strictly responsible for the conduct of its 
supervisors.-7 The ultimate focus must always be on the agency 
relationship, not supervisory status itself. Therefore, we 
reject the PBA's argument for attribution of Smith's conduct to 
the City as a matter of law simply because Smith is a supervisor, 
high-level or otherwise.-7 The pertinent inquiry is simply 
whether, in the totality of circumstances, the employer may 
fairly be said to be responsible for a given individual's 
actions. In the context of this case, we find that the answer to 
that inquiry must be no. 
Smith's testimony that he was told by the Police 
Commissioner that he could not change the posted hours of the 
shift is competent, admissible and unrebutted. In that 
-
70ur approach parallels that under the National Labor Relations 
Act. See IAM v. NLRB. 311 U.S. 72, 7 LRRM 282 (1940) . 
^Deer Park Union Free School Dist.. 22 PERB f3014 (1989), aff'a 
21 PERB f4535 (1988) (subsequent history omitted); Board of Educ. 
of the Citv School Dist. of the Citv of New York, 15 PERB f3136, 
aff'a 15 PERB 14603 (1982). 
-
7As the Assistant Director observed, however, Smith is also in 
the PBA's unit. 
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circumstance, Smith's dealings with Moffett, of which no other 
person in the City or PBA was aware, can only be seen as wholly 
unauthorized. However liberal our application of agency theories 
has been and remains, it does not extend to hold the City 
responsible for clandestine discussions conducted by a supervisor 
who has disobeyed the specific instructions of a superior 
officer. In the totality of circumstances, the record most 
reasonably read shows that two unit employees entered into an 
arrangement for their mutual benefit unbeknownst to either the 
City or the PBA. There can be no attribution of misconduct to 
the City in such circumstances. 
The PBA argues alternatively that the City should be held 
responsible for Smith's actions because it subsequently ratified 
or condoned his conduct. We have examined the record in this 
respect and find no basis in Smith's testimony or otherwise to 
find that the City authorized, encouraged or ratified Smith's 
direct dealing with Moffett. 
Near the end of the PBA's cross-examination of Smith, the 
Assistant Director sustained the City's objection to a question 
as to whether there was any issue pending regarding Assistant 
Chief- positions-. As—explained-by— the—PBA-,—the—question—was 
designed to elicit information as to whether captains had been 
"cutting their own deals" with the City. The Assistant Director 
concluded that the information sought was irrelevant to the 
pending charge. We agree. Evidence of the existence of any 
agreements between Smith or others and the City apart from the 
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PBA contract has no probative value in determining whether the 
City violated the Act based on Smith's dealing with Moffett. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are 
dismissed and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
uline R. Kinsella,1 ct hairperson 
ZL^? 
WalterL^, Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
2D- 6/29/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PAUL M. CROSS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13889 
STATE OF NEW YORK (INSURANCE FUND) and 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
PAUL M. CROSS, pro se 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Respondent Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (REBECCA L. 
CAUDLE of counsel), for Respondent State of New York 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Paul M. Cross excepts to the dismissal, as deficient, of an 
improper practice charge filed on October 1, 1992 against the 
State of New York (Insurance Fund) (State) and the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
Having reviewed the original charge, its amendment and 
subsequent—clarification-,—the—exceptions—and—responses—thereto, 
we find that the Director properly dismissed the charge as 
untimely because it was not filed within four months of any 
actions complained of as required by §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of 
Procedure. 
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) 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
2E- 6/29/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HUGO GREGORY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12 9 60 
AFSCME, COUNCIL 66 AND LOCAL 2055, and 
CAPITAL DISTRICT OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
HUGO GREGORY, Pro se 
FRED PFEIFFER, for Respondent AFSCME, Council 66 and 
Local 2055 
x ROGER L. DWORSKY, ESQ., for Respondent Capital District Off-
Track Betting Corporation 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
i 
Hugo Gregory excepts to the dismissal, after hearing, of his 
improper practice charge against AFSCME, Council 66 and Local 
2055 (AFSCME) and the Capital District Off-Track Betting 
Corporation (OTB). The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
found that Gregory had not met his burden of proving that AFSCME 
and OTB violated, respectively, §209-a.2(a) and §209-a.l(c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Gregory's 
charge alleges that AFSCME breached its duty of fair 
representation when it resolved certain of his grievances in a 
manner unsatisfactory to him and that it failed to properly 
respond to his claim, which is the basis for his charge against 
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OTB, that 0TB retaliated against him by issuing certain letters 
of reprimand in 1991 because he obtained a grievance award in 
November 1989 which reduced the penalty proposed by OTB for 
certain acts of alleged misconduct. 
In his exceptions, Gregory appears to assert that the AKT 
did not ask sufficient questions of the witnesses who appeared to 
testify. It is not, however, the role of the ALT to prosecute a 
charge on behalf of a charging party, even one who appears pro 
se, and the burden of proving a charge rests upon the charging 
party, not the ALT.-7 The exceptions in this regard are, 
accordingly, denied. 
Gregory also makes frequent reference in his exceptions to 
the manner in which his 1989 grievance and 1990 arbitration 
hearings were conducted. These matters are not the subject of 
the original charge, nor could they be, because they occurred 
well beyond the four-month limitation period contained in our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules).-' They are, therefore, not properly 
before us. 
Finally, Gregory disputes the conclusion reached by the ALJ 
that the evidence presented does not establish any causal 
connection between Gregory's 1989 case and the reprimands he 
received from OTB which gave rise to this charge. However, no 
facts are presented which would support reversal of this finding. 
-
;
 See Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. and State of New 
York (Rockland P . O . 25 PERB 53012 (1992). 
-' See Rules §204.1(a) (1) . 
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Indeed, the record is devoid of evidence of any causal connection 
between the actions of OTB in 1991 and the earlier grievance, 
which resulted in a shorter suspension than requested by OTB, but 
with a finding against Gregory on the charges themselves. The 
charge against the OTB alleging discrimination for the exercise 
of activities protected by the Act was, accordingly, properly 
dismissed by the AKT. 
Furthermore, we concur with the ALJ's finding that AFSCME's 
exercise of discretion and judgment in the handling of Gregory's 
grievances did not breach its statutory duty of fair 
representation because the record fails to establish that the 
handling of those grievances by AFSCME was arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or conducted in bad faith. The factual findings 
made by the ALJ in making this finding are adopted here. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
2F- 6/29/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, 
Charging Party, 
and CASE NO. U-12629 
TOWN OP HUNTINGTON, 
Respondent. 
EDWARD J. HENNESSEY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JOHN J. LEO, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Huntington (Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) upon a charge filed by Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees (Local 342). After a hearing, the ALJ held 
that the Town violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when Glen LaMay, the Town's 
Director of the Department of General Services, entered into an 
agreement with Charlotte Schombs, a supervisor in the Department 
of General Services, regarding the compensation to be paid to 
members of the blue-collar unit for "out-of-class" work. Local 
342 represents both the supervisors' unit, which includes 
Schombs' title, and the blue-collar unit, which represents 
employees supervised by Schombs. 
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The ALT concluded that although Schombs was not authorized 
by Local 342 to bargain on behalf of its rank-and-file employees, 
she and LaMay nonetheless negotiated and agreed upon a method of 
compensation to settle a dispute regarding out-of-class pay. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was never actually 
put into effect, the ALT found a violation of the Act to have 
occurred because LaMay knew or should have known that Schombs was 
not a representative of Local 342, with whom negotiations must 
exclusively take place. 
The Town has filed several exceptions to the ALJ's decision, 
each of which Local 342 argues in its response is without merit. 
For the reasons which follow, we must reverse the ALJ's decision 
and dismiss the charge. 
The facts of this case are not in dispute before us. The 
record establishes that LaMay believed that employees should only 
be paid for the actual hours they worked out-of-class, while 
Local 342 believed that employees were entitled, consistent with 
the Town's past practice, to eight hours' pay for out-of-class 
work of any duration. Toward the end of 1990, LaMay began to 
change the timesheets submitted by Schombs to reflect only the 
time actually worked by the employees out-of-class. After being 
made aware of these changes, Schombs, who had been advised by her 
predecessor of the practice of paying employees eight hours for 
any out-of-class work, discussed the modified timesheets with 
Local 342 representatives Pauline Higgins and James Ekenstierna 
and with LaMay. She thereafter, on June 19, 1991, conceived the 
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notion that a resolution of the difference between LaMay's 
approach and Local 342's position, apparently supported by a past 
practice, could be achieved by establishing an out-of-class 
payment procedure whereby employees would be compensated for four 
hours of out-of-class pay if they worked four hours or less out-
of-class, and would be compensated for eight hours of out-of-
class pay if they worked more than four hours out-of-class. On 
her own initiative, Schombs presented this proposal to LaMay, who 
accepted it. She immediately thereafter contacted Higgins and 
presented the proposal to her. Higgins informed Schombs that the 
proposal or "agreement" was unacceptable to Local 342, and 
directed Schombs to so advise LaMay. Schombs advised LaMay that 
the solution she had discussed with him was unacceptable to Local 
342 and it was never implemented. 
The ALT concluded, based upon these facts, that LaMay had 
entered into an "agreement" with Schombs, when he knew or should 
have known that Schombs was not the duly authorized representative 
of Local 342 to conduct negotiations on behalf of the rank-and-
file employees, and that his negotiations and agreement with 
Schombs thereby violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act. We 
disagree. 
It is our determination that, notwithstanding Schombs' 
reference in her testimony to it as an "agreement", the 
discussion which she initiated with LaMay constituted nothing 
more than a proposal on her part, as a mid-level supervisor, to 
her own supervisor to resolve a dispute concerning compensation 
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of her subordinates. Schombs' efforts to offer a solution to the 
problem of compensation did not constitute negotiations on behalf 
of Local 342, and LaMay's "acceptance" of Schombs' proposal did 
not give rise to an "agreement" within the meaning of the Act. 
We find instead that Schombs merely made a proposal for 
resolution, which she presented to LaMay. LaMay's acceptance of 
the proposal constituted an authorization to present the proposal 
to Local 342 on behalf of the Town. In view of Local 342's 
rejection of the proposal, no agreement was reached which could 
have been implemented. Indeed, the lack of implementation 
supports the conclusion that LaMay and Schombs never had as their 
purpose the settlement of the rank-and-file employees' terms and 
conditions of employment, that they never negotiated an agreement 
and that they understood that Local 342's consent to the proposal 
was necessary to the existence of an agreement. Furthermore, 
Schombs' immediate presentation of the proposal to the 
appropriate Local 342 representative after receiving LaMay's 
"acceptance" of the proposal and her prompt notification to LaMay 
of Local 342's rejection of the proposal clearly establish her 
understanding that she was not engaged in negotiations on behalf 
of Local 342 but was acting as an agent on behalf of the Town to 
solicit and communicate Local 342's response to the Town's 
proposal. Therefore, the finding that the Town improperly 
negotiated an agreement with a nonrepresentative of Local 342 
must be reversed. 
Board - U-12629 
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Based upon the foregoing, we find that the Town, by 
its agent, LaMay, did not engage in negotiations with a person 
other than the duly designated bargaining agent, Local 342, and 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^J>^^Jw^u 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Walte^ -^ Cf Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
2G- 6/29/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12621 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OP THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
DAVID BASS, ESQ. (JERRY ROTHMAN of counsel), for Respondent 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (FREDERICK K. REICH of counsel), for 
Respondent United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-
CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of Ronald Grassel to 
the dismissal of his charge against the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District) and the 
United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) 
(together, respondents). At the close of Grassel's direct case 
after two days of hearing, the assigned Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) granted the motion of both respondents to dismiss the 
charge for failure to establish a prima facie case. For the 
reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
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Grassel alleges that the District violated §2 09-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and that 
the UFT violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by failing to process 
grievances, which he filed in accordance with the terms of the 
respondents' collective bargaining agreement. Grassel's 
grievances allege various acts of harassment, which appear to 
relate primarily to: the removal of material from file cabinets 
which he had utilized in the course of his responsibilities as a 
teacher, while he was on sabbatical during the first half of 
1991; the subsequent request to him that he come in from his 
sabbatical leave to oversee and participate in the removal of his 
materials to another location for the purpose of addressing 
certain space problems; and the movement or disposal of that 
material by others, following his refusal, because he was on 
sabbatical leave, to come into the workplace to remove his 
materials. 
In particular, Grassel alleges that grievances which he 
filed, dated January 11, January 16, February 15, February 25, 
and March 15, 1991, were not heard at the third step of the 
respondents' grievance procedure, but were instead remanded from 
the third step to the second step for the purpose of conducting a 
Step 2 hearing, which had not previously been held. Grassel 
argues that the remand of his grievances to Step 2 instead of 
hearing them at Step 3 violated the terms of the grievance 
procedure and that, following remand, no Step 2 hearing has been 
conducted in any event. 
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The disposition of the grievances in issue is as follows. 
The January 11 grievance was sustained in part in a Step 2 
decision; the January 16 grievance was generally denied, pursuant 
to the same Step 2 decision, but partial relief was granted in 
the form of a directive that no materials should be removed from 
the cabinets in which Grassel was storing his material until he 
could assist in the process, a matter which was the subject of 
his grievance. The subsequent grievances filed by Grassel relate 
to this directive, which Grassel asserted violated his 
contractual sabbatical leave rights because it forced him to 
return to the workplace during his leave. 
The record discloses that the February 15 grievance was 
resolved and, at the hearing before the ALJ, was withdrawn by 
Grassel from consideration as part of his charge. It was, 
accordingly, primarily the February 25 and March 15, 1991 
grievances which were the subject of a Step 3 meeting which 
resulted, by agreement of the UFT and the District, in the remand 
of the grievances to Step 2 for the purpose of conducting a 
hearing at that level. The Step 2 hearing was not, however, held 
by the District because following the remand, Grassel failed to 
respond to a written request that he contact the District so that 
a date for such a hearing could be arranged. 
The ALJ determined that Grassel failed to establish a prima 
facie case that the UFT breached its duty of fair representation 
by acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith manner in 
its representation of him concerning his grievances or that the 
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District's handling of his grievances discriminated against him 
because of his engagement in activity protected by the Act. The 
ALJ found that there was no factual basis to conclude that 
Grassel was treated any differently by the UFT representatives 
who provided representation to him than were other bargaining 
unit members, or that any delay in proceeding with his grievances 
was violative of the Act. The evidence presented by Grassel that 
the District failed to comply with, and the UFT failed to 
enforce, the time limits contained in their collective bargaining 
agreement, does not establish a violation of the Act in the 
absence of evidence, not here present, that the noncompliance was 
improperly motivated and/or discriminatory. 
Having reviewed the record in this matter, we agree with the 
ALJ that Grassel has failed to meet his burden of proving a 
breach of the duty of fair representation with respect to the 
handling of his grievances by the UFT. Accordingly, the ALJ 
properly dismissed so much of the charge as alleges a violation 
of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
We also find that the ALJ also properly dismissed so 
much of Grassel's charge as alleges a violation by the District 
of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act because Grassel failed to 
establish that any failure on the part of the Distict to timely 
process his grievances, to conduct hearings at Steps 1 and 2, or 
to unilaterally schedule a hearing at the Step 2 level following 
a remand from Step 3 was due to Grassel's engagement in 
activities protected by the Act. That these actions may have 
violated the terms of the respondents' collective bargaining 
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agreement does not, by itself, establish a violation of the Act 
by the District. The charge against the District was, 
accordingly, properly dismissed by the ALJ. 
Grassel's final exception relates to the refusal by the 
assigned ALJ to reopen the record in order to receive evidence 
concerning the merits of the grievances which he filed. The ALJ 
properly denied Grassel's motion in this regard because he was 
afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his case and 
rested at its conclusion. The evidence Grassel thereafter sought 
to introduce was not new evidence which could not have been 
offered during the course of the presentation of his case, and it 
was, in any event, not relevant to the disposition of the 
charge.^ Grassel's motion to this Board to reopen the hearing 
and/or receive the same additional evidence is properly denied 
upon the same grounds. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
/^H.^ rr>no SnUv 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter-, L. Eisenberg, Member X 
1/ See County of Nassau , 18 PERB <J[3076 (1985) . 
2H- 6/29/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 1056, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO. U-12 982 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, DIVISION 72 6, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12983 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (WALTER M. MEGINNISS, JR. 
and KENT Y. HIROZAWA of counsel), for Charging Parties 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, GENERAL COUNSEL (EDWARD F. 
ZAGAJESKI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated September 9, 1992, an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) held that the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority) violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, in November 1991, it unilaterally 
adopted a random drug and alcohol testing policy for the 
Authority's bus operators, maintenance employees and stock 
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handlers who are represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 1056, AFL-CIO and Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 726, AFL-CIO (Unions). 
The Authority has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision in 
which it argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of fact and law in 
finding a random drug and alcohol testing policy covering 
employees in safety-sensitive positions to be a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. 
The Unions have moved to have the Authority's exceptions 
dismissed as either moot and/or because further litigation would 
not effectuate the policies of the Act. The Unions' papers show 
that, after the ALJ issued his decision, the parties ratified 
successors to the collective bargaining agreements which expired 
on April 30, 1991. The current contracts, covering the period 
May 1, 1991 through July 31, 1994, contain provisions for the 
random selection of bargaining unit members for drug and alcohol 
testing. Further, each contract contains a provision calling for 
the Unions to withdraw the improper practice charges in issue.-1 
The Authority has filed papers in response which support the 
Unions' motion and urge us to close the cases. 
We are in agreement with the parties' mutual recognition 
that further litigation in these matters is unnecessary and 
potentially detrimental to their existing and future bargaining 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
denied the Unions' withdrawal request because the ALJ had by then 
released his decision. 
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relationship and agreements. We also believe that the novel 
issues in litigation should be decided in circumstances in which 
the litigants have a material stake in the outcome of the 
proceeding. It is the presence of that actual case or 
controversy which best ensures the careful development of our 
jurisprudence and safeguards the integrity of our process. The 
judicious use and conservation of the parties' and our own 
resources also militate against consideration of these charges at 
this time. Moreover, permitting the Unions to honor their 
contractual commitment to withdraw these charges is entirely 
consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act. As we have 
previously observed: 
The conclusion of final negotiations affords the 
parties an opportune time to cooperate in achieving 
stable and harmonious relations by resolving all 
outstanding disputes.-7 
The charges in issue center on a disputed refusal to bargain and 
the parties have reached a negotiated resolution of. that dispute 
which fully disposes of the controversy between them and leads 
them to their mutual request to close these cases. In such 
circumstances, further litigation will not yield any tangible 
gain or serve any statutory purpose. 
g/State of New York and Public Employees Fed'n, 14 PERB ^3 043, at 
3071 (1981). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the cases are closed, 
without consideration of the merits of the parties' allegations 
or arguments and without any review of the ALJ's decision and 
order. SO ORDERED. 
-DATED:- -June -29T -1993 
Albany, New York 
%J:^<M^J(L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Waltep-L-v7 Eisenberg, Member y 
€c^f^A>O^UL 
Eric J^^&tfhmertz, Member (, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Greece (Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
.J After a hearing, the ALJ sustained, in part, the charge filed 
against the Town by the Communication Workers of America, 
Local 1170 (Local 1170), which alleges that the Town violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when, effective January 1, 1991, it changed its practice of 
permitting employees to use Town vehicles to commute to and from 
work. The ALJ found that it was the Town's practice to permit 
on-call employees to use Town vehicles to commute. The ALJ found 
no violation as to those employees whose on-call status was 
eliminated in conjunction with a departmental reorganization in 
September 1990. The ALJ found, however, that certain unit 
employees retained their on-call status until February 10, 1992. 
As to those employees, the ALJ held that the Town violated its 
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duty to bargain when it unilaterally discontinued its practice o 
permitting them to use Town vehicles to commute. 
The Town's exception to the ALJ's decision rests upon the 
argument that Article 2 2 of the collective bargaining agreement 
with Local 1170 constitutes a waiver of the right to bargain the 
discontinuation of the vehicle use practice and that the ALT 
erred in failing to so find.-7 Local 1170 has not responded to 
the Town's exceptions. 
Article 22, captioned "COMPLETE AGREEMENT", provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
The parties acknowledge that, during the 
negotiations that preceded this Agreement, each had the 
unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and 
proposals with respect to any subject or matter not 
removed by law from the area of collective 
negotiations, and that the understandings and 
agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise 
of that right and opportunity are set forth in this 
Agreement. Therefore, for the life of this Agreement, 
the employer and the union each voluntarily and 
unqualifiedly waives the right and each agrees that the 
other shall not be obligated to negotiate collectively 
with respect to any subject or matter referred to or 
covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any 
subject or matter not specifically referred to or 
covered in this Agreement, even though such subjects or 
matters may not have been within the knowledge or 
contemplation of either or both of the parties at the 
time they negotiated and signed this Agreement. 
This Agreement shall represent all employees7 
rights, privileges and benefits granted by the Town to 
its employees; and unless specifically and expressly 
set forth in this Agreement, all practices and benefits 
previously granted are not in effect. 
-'That article appeared in the parties' 1989-9 0 contract and was 
continued under the terms of an arbitration award covering 1991-
92. 
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The ALJ interpreted Article 22 to mean only that neither 
party was required to engage in negotiations during the term of 
the agreement. On that interpretation, the ALJ held that 
Article 22 did not permit the Town to change what the Town 
concedes is a long-standing noncontractual practice embracing a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The Town's argument to us is based entirely upon the second 
paragraph of Article 22. That clause has a meaning distinct from 
the first paragraph of Article 22, which necessitates our 
reversal of the ALJ's decision. The second paragraph reduces 
"all employees' rights, privileges and benefits" to those 
"specifically and expressly" set forth in the agreement. As we 
read the second paragraph of Article 22, noncontractual 
practices, such as the Town's vehicle use practice, are 
discontinued. The second paragraph of Article 22 is like the 
contract provision in Sachem Central School District,-7 in which 
we found that similarly broad language, under which matters not 
covered by the parties' agreement were left to the employer's 
discretion and control, waived the union's right to bargain or 
contest changes in noncovered terms and conditions of employment. 
In effect, there could not be a cognizable unilateral change in 
noncontractual practices after the parties' agreement to the 
second paragraph of Article 22 because there were not thereafter 
any past practices which the Town was statutorily required to 
2/21 PERB f3021 (1988) 
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maintain. The Town having reverted to its contractual rights,-7 
its elimination of the practice permitting on-call employees to 
use Town vehicles to commute cannot violate its duty to bargain. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions to 
the ALJ's decision finding it in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act are granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^ L^ie-k^fL 
Pau l ine R. K m s e l l a , Chairperson 
, Member 
^See State of New York - Unified Court System, 2 6 PERB 5[3 013 
(1993). 
2J- 6/29/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME 
Council 66, Local 93 0, Erie County Water Authority Blue Collar 
Employees' Union (AFSCME) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on a unit 
placement petition affecting certain employees of the Erie County 
Water Authority (Authority). The following titles are in issue: 
Water Maintenance Crew Chief; Water Service Crew Chief; 
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Hydrant/Valve Crew Chief; Assistant Water Maintenance Crew Chief; 
Assistant Water Service Crew Chief; Assistant Hydrant/Valve Crew 
Chief; and Assistant Instrumentation, Electrical and Electronics 
Technician. The Authority initially placed these titles into the 
white-collar unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), which has 
intervened in this proceeding. 
After a hearing, the Director dismissed the petition. The 
Water Maintenance Crew Chief and the Water Service Crew Chief 
were found not to be new or substantially altered positions,-7 
but mere retitlings of positions already included in CSEA's unit. 
The Director determined that the other titles-7 were not 
appropriately placed into AFSCME's blue-collar unit. After 
comparing relative skill levels of the employees in both units, 
the job duties of the positions and the level of supervisory 
responsibility and authority to be exercised, the Director 
concluded that placement of the in-issue titles into CSEA's 
white-collar unit would more likely give rise to common 
negotiating goals, would better avoid potential conflicts of 
interest and would better serve the Authority's administrative 
-''Unit placement petitions may be filed only with respect to such 
positions. Rules of Procedure §201.2(b). 
-''The Director held alternatively that the Water Maintenance Crew 
Chief and the Water Service Crew Chief were also most 
appropriately placed into CSEA's white-collar unit. AFSCME's 
exceptions do not directly challenge the Director's finding that 
these two titles were not new or substantially altered, only the 
alternative basis for his unit placement determination. 
Board - CP-248 -3 
convenience and operational needs than would a placement of the 
titles into AFSCME's blue-collar unit. 
AFSCME argues in its exceptions that the Director's decision 
is generally arbitrary, irrational, contrary to the record 
evidence and inconsistent with applicable uniting standards. The 
Authority and CSEA in their responses support the Director's 
decision as both factually and legally correct. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Preliminarily, AFSCME argues that this matter should have 
been held in abeyance pending a determination on an improper 
practice charge filed by AFSCME against the Authority which 
alleges that the Authority's initial placement of the titles into 
CSEA's unit was improperly motivated. Section 2 05.5(d) of the 
Act, however, provides that improper practice charges may not 
delay the determination of representation questions. The 
Director's decision to proceed with the investigation of this 
representation question was, therefore, entirely consistent with 
the Act and did not involve any abuse of discretion which might 
otherwise be subject to our review. 
AFSCME also argues that the Director incorrectly applied a 
per se supervisory exclusion rule in placing the titles into 
CSEA's unit. The Director, however, has not adopted or applied a 
per se approach to the disposition of unit placement petitions, 
generally or specifically. The Director here found that each of 
the titles in issue had and would exercise a level of supervision 
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over rank-and-file employees different than that exercised by the 
"working foremen11/"leadmen" in AFSCME's unit. Nor was the level 
of supervision the only basis for the Director's decision. He 
also considered the job duties of the positions, required skills, 
bargaining compatibility, the historical composition of the units 
and the Authority's administrative convenience and operational 
needs. It was this combination of factors, not any per se 
supervisory exclusion, which persuaded the Director that the 
titles in issue were most appropriately placed into CSEA's unit. 
Therefore, AFSCME's exception in this respect is dismissed. 
The rest of AFSCME's many exceptions allege, directly or 
indirectly, that the Director inaccurately or incompletely 
described the record facts and rendered a decision inconsistent 
with the uniting standards in §2 07 of the Act. The Director's 
decision is clearly a summary of the evidence developed during 
the three days of hearing. Having reviewed the record, however, 
we find the Director's decision to be accurate and complete in 
material respects. We also find that the Director properly 
analyzed and applied the uniting criteria in §2 07 of the Act to 
the facts of the case. His decision reflects neither a 
mechanistic application of any per se placement rule nor an 
unreasoned, automatic deferral to the Authority's initial 
placement of the titles into CSEA's unit. In the context of this 
case, the issue is not whether the Act prohibits the placement of 
any of the in-issue titles in AFSCME's unit, but whether those 
titles are most appropriately placed in the blue-collar unit or 
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CSEA's white-collar unit. The conclusion that the titles were 
most appropriately placed in CSEA's unit reflects an 
understanding of the differing interests of blue-collar and 
white-collar employees and an awareness of the statutory uniting 
standards„ 
In closing, we note that AFSCME's exceptions reflect an 
obvious concern that certain promotional opportunities for its 
members under the Authority's new career ladder would be to 
positions in CSEA's unit if the Director's decision were to be 
affirmed. Although we understand AFSCME's interest in 
establishing and maintaining promotional opportunities within its 
unit, that is not a statutory factor to be considered in 
determining the appropriate unit placement of these employees. 
For the reasons set forth above, AFSCME's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Walter^Lv? Eisenberg, Member C 
S chme rt z, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On a stipulated 
record, the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge against the State of New 
York - Unified Court System (UCS), which alleges that the UCS 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it refused to negotiate CSEA's demand regarding layoff 
units and layoff order for certain UCS employees it represents. The 
ALJ held that the determination of layoff units is a civil service 
function reserved to the Chief Administrator of the Courts and 
exercised by him in his civil service capacity. Finding that 
matters reserved to the jurisdiction of a civil service commission 
are not mandatorily negotiable, the ALJ held that UCS was not 
required to bargain pursuant to CSEA's demand. 
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CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding the 
layoff unit aspects of its demand to be nonmandatory and further 
erred by treating its demand as a unitary one.-7 In the latter 
respect, CSEA argues that the layoff order aspects of its demand are 
severable from the layoff units aspects and are themselves 
mandatorily negotiable. 
UCS argues in its response that the ALJ's finding that the 
demand is unitary and nonmandatory is correct, but that even if not 
unitary, the demand is still nonmandatory because it affects 
appointments that are governed by statute, interferes with UCS' 
right to determine which services are to be reduced or eliminated, 
and concerns appointments over which the Chief Administrator does 
not have the authority to negotiate. 
The demand in issue was submitted by CSEA in response to the 
Chief Administrator's designation in August 1991 of layoff units for 
the suspension and demotion of employees and the abolition in 
September 1991 of 471 nonjudicial positions statewide. That demand 
provides as follows: 
Temporary and provisional employees in competitive 
class positions; employees in noncompetitive class 
positions who have fewer than five years of continuous 
service; and employees in exempt and noncompetitive-
confidential positions will be suspended or demoted among 
themselves in inverse order of original UCS appointment by 
title or layoff unit. 
-'A unitary demand is one whose various elements cannot be severed and 
treated individually as separate demands. 
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Such employees shall have rights to displace other 
employees with the same appointment status, in the manner 
set forth in Rule 25.30(e). Length of service for such 
employees shall be determined as set forth in Rule 
25.30(b) and (c). 
Layoff units for these purposes shall be as follows: 
Judicial Districts 3-9: Each such district is 
a-unitr 
Judicial District 10: Nassau and Suffolk County 
each form a unit. 
New York City: One unit. 
All other members shall be in the unit, as specified 
above, in which their workstation is located (e.g., a 
Court of Claims Court Clerk in Goshen is in the 9th 
Judicial District Unit). 
Such employees shall be placed on preferred lists for 
reinstatement among themselves in order of original 
appointment, in the manner set forth in Rule 2 5. 31.-7 
UCS refused to negotiate the demand on the ground that it does not 
concern a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Judiciary Law §211.1(d) empowers the Chief Judge to establish 
standards and administrative policies for UCS, consistent with the 
Civil Service Law (CSL), including but not limited to personnel 
practices affecting nonjudicial personnel and relating to their 
removal. Judiciary Law §212.1 provides that the Chief Administrator 
of the Courts, on behalf of the Chief Judge, supervises the 
administration and operation of the courts and exercises such powers 
and responsibilities as have been delegated to him by the Chief 
Judge. The Rules of the Chief Judge, §25.30, provide that the Chief 
The references to various "Rule" sections are to the Rules of the 
Chief Judge. 
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Administrator may designate a unit for the suspension and demotion 
of employees. In an earlier decision,-7 we affirmed the decision 
of an ALJ that the exercise of such powers as they relate to the 
establishment of promotion units was nonmandatory because it was 
"inextricably intertwined with the exercise of managerial 
prerogatives relating to the determination of employment 
qualifications and staff deployment."-7 However, we there found 
it unnecessary to adopt the ALJ's reasoning that the Chief 
Administrator, in the exercise of his civil service 
responsibilities, was not acting in the capacity of employer, but as 
a civil service commission. The ALJ, in the instant matter, relied 
upon the other ALJ's earlier finding and determined that, likewise, 
the Chief Administrator's designation of layoff units was part of 
his civil service function and, therefore, outside the scope of 
collective bargaining.-7 
We hereby affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge; however, we 
do so on other grounds and decline to adopt the ALJ's rationale. 
Judiciary Law §36.1 provides that "each justice of the supreme court 
may appoint and at pleasure remove one law clerk and one secretary, 
subject to standards and administrative policies promulgated 
l/
 State of New York - Unified Court System, 25 PERB ^3065 (1992). 
-
;
 Id. at 313 6. 
-
f
 Unlike the previous matter, Judiciary Law §211, which established 
the Chief Judge's responsibility to establish promotion units, 
does not compel the adoption of layoff units. The Chief Judge's 
Rules allow him that right, which he has delegated to the Chief 
Administrator, but that right is not sufficient to remove the 
subject matter from collective bargaining. 
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pursuant to section twenty-eight of article six of the 
constitution." The demand made by CSEA covers employees in these 
positions and infringes upon the statutory right of justices of the 
supreme court to appoint and remove their confidential law clerks 
and secretaries by giving displacement rights to other, more senior, 
clerks and secretaries in the same layoff unit. As such, the demand 
as to them is nonmandatory as it contravenes a statutory 
provision.-7 
Additionally, the demand could continue the employment of a 
provisional employee beyond the statutory term of employment, a 
result inconsistent with CSL §65.-/ This provision also renders 
6/ 
V 
City of Rochester. 12 PERB H3010 (1979); Local 788 and City of 
Plattsburah v. N.Y. Council 66, AFSCME. 108 A.D. 2d 1045, 18 PERB 
H7510 (3d Dep't 1985). 
CSL §65.4 provides: 
Successive provisional appointments shall not be made 
to the same position after the expiration of the 
authorized period of the original provisional 
appointment to such position; provided, however, that 
where an examination for a position or a group of 
positions fails to produce a list adequate to fill all 
positions then held on a provisional basis, or where 
such list is exhausted immediately following its 
establishment, a new provisional appointment may be 
made to any such position remaining unfilled by 
permanent appointment, and such new provisional 
appointment may, in the discretion of the appointing 
authority, be given to a current or former provisional 
appointee in such position, except that a current or 
former provisional appointee who becomes eligible for 
permanent appointment to any such position shall, if he 
is then to be continued in or appointed to any such 
position be afforded permanent appointment to such 
position. 
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the demand nonmandatory as "[t]he statutory scheme for provisional 
appointments contained in section 65 of the Civil Service Law 
implicitly prohibits collective bargaining by a public employer as 
to the renewal of a provisional appointment."-7 
From its content and presentment, we determine CSEA's demand to 
be a unitary one whose provisions cannot be severed. Therefore, the 
nonmandatory portions of the demand render the entire demand 
nonmandatory. -7 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision dismissing 
the charge is affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Vfut.^x fL.K\/\SC/(lA 
Pauline R. Kmsella,1 Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
5/
 City of Binghamton. 63 A.D.2d 790, 791, 11 PERB [^7546 (3d Dep't 
1978). 
-' City of Rochester, supra; Pearl River Union Free School Dist., 11 
PERB H3085 (1978). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Nassau (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) in which the ALJ sustained, in part, a charge filed by the 
Civil Services Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 83 0 (CSEA). The ALJ found that the County 
had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by unilaterally requiring certain unit employees of the 
County's Department of Public Works (DPW) to surrender their 
assigned County-owned vehicles at the end of each workday, 
thereby altering the long-standing practice of allowing them to 
use the vehicles on a twenty-four-hour basis in connection with 
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their employment, as well as for transportation to and from work. 
CSEA has filed a response to the County's exceptions, which 
supports the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The ALJ found - and the County's exceptions do not dispute -
that in January, 1992, the Commissioner of the DPW directed all 
employees who had use of County-owned vehicles, excluding those 
who are on-call twenty-four hours per day, to surrender their 
vehicles at the end of each workday. As a result, nearly one 
hundred employees of the DPW who use the vehicles for County-
related business lost the right to use them for transportation to 
and from work. The Commissioner's directive was implemented 
without prior negotiations with CSEA. 
In finding that CSEA had met its burden of establishing a 
prima facie violation of the Act, the ALJ relied on our decision 
in County of Nassau,-'' where we held that the County's practice 
of allowing DPW employees to retain their assigned County-owned 
vehicles for personal use during nonworking hours was a 
mandatorily negotiable economic benefit which could not be 
unilaterally withdrawn. Finding no evidence in the record before 
him which would remove the subject from the scope of mandatory 
negotiations, the ALJ held that CSEA had met its burden of 
^13 PERB |J[3095 (1980), conf'd, 14 PERB 57017 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Co. 1981), aff'd. 87 A.D.2d 1006, 15 PERB ^7012 (2d Dep't 1982), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 57 N.Y.2d 601, 15 PERB ^7030 
(1982) . 
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proving a prima facie violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act.-7 He 
then considered the County's defenses and concluded that they 
lacked merit. Accordingly, the ALT ordered the restoration of 
the practice and a "make whole" remedy. 
The County raises three exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
First, it contends that CSEA failed to meet its burden of showing 
a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. In that regard, it argues 
that CSEA did not prove how the practice was applied within 
certain of the five divisions of the DPW. However, the DPW's 
departmental policy concerning the use of its vehicles, which is 
applicable to all five divisions, provides that once a vehicle is 
assigned, the employees may use it for transportation to and from 
work. We find, therefore, that CSEA met its burden of proving 
that the practice was applicable to all DPW employees, and that 
this economic benefit was unilaterally withdrawn. If the effect 
of the Commissioner's directive were different among the various 
divisions of the DPW, such as to defeat CSEA's prima facie case, 
it was incumbent upon the County to establish it. There being no 
proof to that end, we dismiss this exception. 
The County next contends that its policy with respect to the 
assignment and use of its vehicles allowed it to withdraw the in-
-
7The ALT dismissed CSEA's charge to the extent it complains of 
the effect of the Commissioner's action upon employees who had 
been assigned vehicles but who no longer, or never did, require 
them for County-related business, noting the conditional nature 
of the assignment as found in County of Nassau, 19 PERB H[4580 
(1986). No exceptions have been taken to this conclusion. 
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issue benefit. Contained within the policy is the following 
language: 
The use of the vehicle is restricted to County 
business. It may include transportation to and from 
home to the County place of business. 
The assignment of all vehicles, County and 
contractor, shall be reviewed annually by the 
Commissioner's office for re-evaluation of Department 
needs. Continued vehicle assignment shall not be 
viewed as a permanent right, rather a temporary 
privilege, granted for the performance of specific 
duties. 
Although the County relies upon the second paragraph quoted 
above, we find that this language concerns only the conditions 
under which a vehicle will be assigned to a DPW employee, i.e., 
where the employee requires the use of a vehicle on County-
related business. Once assigned, however, the vehicle may be 
used for transportation to and from work. Since the instant 
improper practice charge concerns the withdrawal of the right to 
use the vehicle for transportation to and from work, not the 
conditions under which a vehicle will be assigned, the County's 
exception based upon the existence of this policy is dismissed. 
Finally, the County contends that the DPW employees executed 
a waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate concerning a withdrawal of 
this economic benefit. However, the ALJ held, and we agree, that 
individual employees have no standing or legal ability to waive a 
statutory right which belongs to their collective bargaining 
agent. In support of its claim that CSEA knew of the waivers, 
and thereby acquiesced to their contents, the County emphasizes a 
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settlement entered between the County and CSEA arising from a 
prior proceeding before PERB.-7 The settlement, entered 
March 30, 1985, provides: 
The County does not have the right to require 
employees to waive any rights under their [collective 
bargaining agreement] or the Act. 
Future "waiver forms" shall be reworded so as to 
clearly constitute written acknowledgement of the 
receipt of County rules, regulations, practices and/or 
interpretations thereof. 
According to the County, this settlement establishes a basis upon 
which the ALJ should have imputed knowledge of the waivers to 
CSEA. 
We find that the language of this settlement simply recites 
the County's right to inform employees of their terms and 
conditions of employment and does not constitute evidence of a 
waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate. Accordingly, we agree with 
the ALT's conclusion that there is no evidence to show that CSEA 
waived its statutory right to bargain concerning the withdrawal 
of employees7 right to use the County-owned vehicles for 
transportation to and from work. Therefore, we dismiss this 
aspect of the County's exceptions. 
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision and hold that the County violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act 
by unilaterally withdrawing the right of unit employees within 
the DPW who are assigned County-owned vehicles to perform County 
^CSEA was represented in that matter by Pauline Kinsella, 
Chairperson of the Board, who has recused herself from the 
instant proceeding. 
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business to use such vehicles for transportation to and from 
work. The County's exceptions are, accordingly, dismissed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the County: 
1. To restore its practice of allowing unit employees 
within the DPW who are assigned vehicles to perform 
County business to use such vehicles for transportation 
to and from work. 
2. To make whole any such bargaining unit members who meet 
the criteria in paragraph 1 above who, upon a showing 
of reasonable documentary evidence, and/or affidavits, 
demonstrate that they incurred expenses which they 
would not have incurred but for the elimination of the 
term and condition of employment described in paragraph 
1 above, with interest at the maximum legal rate 
allowed. 
3. To post the attached notice at all work locations 
customarily used to communicate information to CSEA 
bargaining unit members. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Walter^&s* Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Nassau in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 830, that the County of Nassau: 
1. Will restore its practice of allowing unit employees within the Department of Public Works who 
are assigned vehicles to perform County business to use such vehicles for transportation to 
and from work; 
2. Will make whole any such bargaining unit members who meet the criteria in paragraph 1 
above who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence, and/or affidavits, 
demonstrate that they incurred expenses which they would not have otherwise incurred but 
) for the elimination of the term and condition of employment described in paragraph 1 above, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate allowed. 
Dated , .. , , By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
) 
,.,is Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, LOCAL 688, 
Charging Party7 
-and- CASE NO. U-127 63 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (LAUREN DESOLE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Department of Social Services, Local 688 (CSEA) to an 
Administrative Law Judges's (ALJ) dismissal of CSEA's charge that 
the State of New York (Department of Social Services) (State or 
DSS) violated §209-a.l (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it transferred two employees, Lisa 
Hauth and Deborah Yoder, to other work units within DSS, in 
retaliation for their successful prosecution of two grievances. 
Hauth and Yoder held the same title of Legal Assistant I, a 
Grade 14 position represented by CSEA, and were assigned to the 
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compliance unit within DSS. They were supervised by Henry 
Pedicone and David Amaraian, who reported to Russell Hanks, 
Acting Deputy Counsel for the Office of Administrative Hearings. 
From the time of their hire in 1986, Hauth and Yoder were 
considered to be exemplary employees whose work was consistently 
rated highly effective. During their tenure, they performed a 
variety of tasks which the record established were above the 
duties of a Grade 14 and were similar to the work performed by 
the Social Service Specialists (Grade 18) in their unit. Indeed, 
DSS had been pursuing a title consolidation in order to address 
the out-of-title work situation.-'' 
On February 20, 1990, CSEA filed an out-of-title work 
grievance on their behalf. On February 13, 1991, a decision from 
the Governor's Office of Employee Relations (GOER), at the third, 
and final, step of the contractual grievance procedure ordered 
DSS to cease and desist from assigning Hauth and Yoder job duties 
which were more extensive than those required of a Legal 
Assistant I, to pay them retroactively for the out-of-title work 
they had performed and to continue to pay them the higher salary 
as long as they performed the Grade 18 work. While Hanks at that 
point thought it was necessary to transfer the two employees out 
of the compliance unit in order to address the concerns raised in 
the GOER decision, Amaraian and Pedicone prevailed upon him to 
On May 7, 1992, the title consolidation was approved and the 
Legal Assistant I became the Legal Affairs Specialist, Grade 
14. 
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keep the two in the unit with a modification in their job duties 
which they believed would bring them into compliance. A memo 
issued on March 5, 1991, which decreased the level of independent 
decision-making of Hauth and Yoder and increased their 
supervision by supervisory staff. 
On July 15, 1991, Hauth and Yoder, dissatisfied with the 
modifications in their assignments, filed an additional 
grievance. In addition, CSEA, on July 2, 1991, had commenced a 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Albany County Supreme Court on 
their behalf to enforce the GOER decision. Hanks testified that, 
although he believed the March 5 modification in the duties had 
brought Hauth's and Yoder's assignments into compliance with the 
Step 3 decision, he was concerned about the success of this 
"second wave" of complaints. He determined that he had no 
recourse but to transfer Hauth and Yoder out of the compliance 
unit and to reassign their tasks to two nonunit Social Service 
Assistants I, Bart Delaney and Julio Ocasio, also Grade 14.-1 
Amaraian and Pedicone expressed feelings of disappointment and 
betrayal to Hauth and Yoder over the filing of the grievances, 
especially the second grievance, which they saw as forcing the 
transfer of two employees whom they valued.-7 
-
1
 At that time, there was already a Social Service Assistant I 
assigned to the compliance unit who had been performing 
substantially the same duties as Hauth and Yoder without any 
apparent complaint about the assignment. 
-
7
 That grievance was also sustained at step 3 in a decision 
that held that the modified duties performed by Hauth and 
Yoder were out-of-title and more appropriate to a Grade 18. 
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The ALJ found that Hauth and Yoder's grievance constituted 
engagement in a protected activity and that their supervisors, 
Pedicone and Amaraian, knew of this protected activity. He 
found, however, that Hauth and Yoder were not transferred out of 
their work unit in retaliation for filing, prosecuting and 
prevailing in their grievances, but in order to minimize the 
impact of the success of their first grievance and the likely 
success of their second grievance. The ALJ held that action 
taken to respond to the consequences of a grievance does not 
violate the Act, absent improper motivation.^ The ALJ 
credited Hanks' testimony that it was his good faith belief that 
the modified job duties were within the duties properly required 
of the two Grade 14 Social Service Assistants. Finding no 
evidence of improper motivation, the ALJ dismissed the charge. 
CSEA in its exceptions objects to the ALJ's conclusions, 
advancing essentially the same facts and arguments as were 
presented to the ALJ. However, CSEA has also moved to reopen the 
record to take into evidence a GOER step 3 decision on a 
contractual grievance filed by Delaney and Ocasio, which was 
rendered after the ALJ's decision. Delaney and Ocasio were also 
found to have been performing out-of-title work in the compliance 
unit. The grievance decision notes that DSS conceded that the 
two employees were performing out-of-title work. As this 
Savona Cent. School Dist., 20 PERB ^3055 (1987) ; County of 
Nassau V. PERB, 103 A.D. 2d 274, 17 PERB fl7016 (2d Dep't 
1984) . 
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concession may impact on the credibility resolutions made by the 
ALT,-7 CSEA's motion to reopen must be granted and the matter 
remanded to the ALT to permit the introduction of the step 3 
decision on the Delaney and Ocasio grievance and such other 
evidence regarding that decision as may be appropriate. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that CSEA's motion to reopen is 
granted and the matter is remanded to the ALT. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R.; Kinsella^*-Chairperson 
u__ ^  * 
Walte^L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Memb 
-' CSEA argues that the decision establishes the pretextual 
nature of the reasons given by DSS for Hauth's and Yoder's 
transfers because it states that DSS conceded that the work 
was not Grade 14 work. The ALJ found that Hanks had 
credibly testified to his belief, at the time the 
reassignment was made, that the duties generally fell within 
the job duties of the Social Service Assistants. If the 
concession at Step 3 was made by Hanks, and it is 
established that at the time he made the assignment he knew 
that it involved out-of-title work, a different conclusion 
might be warranted. 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF EAST 
FISHKILL UNIT, DUTCHESS COUNTY LOCAL 814, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3981 
TOWN OF EAST FISHKILL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of East 
Fishkill Unit, Dutchess County Local 814 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Highway Department Employees, all Town 
Police Assistants and Records Clerks, and all 
Town Hall employees. 
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Excluded: Superintendent of Highways, Highway Department 
Working Foreman, Secretary to the 
Superintendent of Highways, Building Inspector, 
Town Assessor, Secretary to the Planning Board, 
Comptroller, Secretary to the Comptroller, 
Recreation Director, and Secretary to the 
Supervisor. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of East 
Fishkill Unit, Dutchess County Local 814. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fJIv-^  T v N W l P 
Pau l ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
E r i c / J . Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED 
INDUSTRY WORKERS, DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4070 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 144, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
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their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All custodians, maintenance, grounds and 
transportation employees, mailpersons, 
instructional media center technicians, 
matrons, and supply and material clerks. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with Local 144, Service 
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
T f T t J ^ h .UfV</l{ L 
Paul ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
fefic J . .S'chmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
">, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NOS. C-4015 & C-4016 
THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(THREE VILLAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT), 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
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the units agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Units: 
Included: 
Excluded: 
Included: 
Excluded: 
Maintenance Unit 
All Custodial Workers, Groundskeepers and 
Members of the Maintenance Staff: A-V 
Technician, Custodial Worker I, Elementary 
Senior Custodian, Custodial Worker II, Sr. 
Custodian Junior High School, Head Custodian 
Elementary, Head Custodian Junior High School, 
Chief Custodian Junior High School^, Chief 
Custodian Senior High School, General 
Maintenance, Maintenance I, and Maintenance II. 
All other employees of the District. 
Clerical Unit 
All Secretaries, Stenographers, and Members of 
the Clerical Staff. 
Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools; 
Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for 
Instructional Services; Secretary to the 
Assistant Superintendent for Personnel 
Services; Secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent for Business Services and all 
other employees of the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
y This title, included in the bargaining unit consented to by 
the parties, was inadvertently omitted in the Decision of 
the Director, Three Village Cent. School Dist.. 26 PERB 
54023 (1993). 
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confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: June 29, 1993 
Albany, New York 
J Paurine R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
